Article ID: | iaor19881041 |
Country: | United States |
Volume: | 7 |
Issue: | 2 |
Start Page Number: | 202 |
End Page Number: | 210 |
Publication Date: | Mar 1988 |
Journal: | Marketing Science |
Authors: | Jeuland Abel P., Shugan Steven M. |
Keywords: | marketing, decision theory, organization |
It is well known that lower channel profits are achieved in the bilateral (manufacturer-reseller) monopoly if manufacturer and reseller independently optimize their respective profits: They take each other’s decisions as given i.e., adopt decision rules that ignore their influence on the other channel member. Higher profits are achieved if they coordinate their profit maximizing decisions. Consequently, there is an economic justification for (1) vertical integration that by definition prevents conflicting profit objectives or (2) contracts that change channel members’ incentives to the compatible objectives of shares of total channel profits.