The Effects of Corporate Venture Capital, Founder Incumbency, and Their Interaction on Entrepreneurial Firms’ R&D Investment Strategies

The Effects of Corporate Venture Capital, Founder Incumbency, and Their Interaction on Entrepreneurial Firms’ R&D Investment Strategies

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Article ID: iaor20173553
Volume: 28
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 670
End Page Number: 689
Publication Date: Aug 2017
Journal: Organization Science
Authors: ,
Keywords: organization, investment, financial, economics, behaviour, research, innovation
Abstract:

Corporate venture capital (CVC) investment has increasingly become an important source of entrepreneurial finance. Accordingly, while scholars have traditionally focused on understanding the main motivations behind CVC activity and its impact on the investing corporate firm, more recently, scholars have also started to emphasize the importance of understanding the impact of CVC investment on the investee venture. In particular, these recent studies commonly show that CVC investment has a positive effect on the venture’s innovation. While the positive link between CVC investment and the venture’s innovation output is well established in the literature, the organizational mechanisms through which this relationship unfolds within the venture remain relatively underexplored. In this study, we fill this gap in the literature by examining the effects of CVC ownership, founder incumbency, and the CVC investor–founder interaction on research and development (R&D) investment strategies in venture capital (VC)‐financed, technology‐based entrepreneurial ventures. In doing so, we aim to provide a novel explanation of the organizational mechanisms that lead to greater investment in research and development (R&D), especially with regard to the interaction between CVC investors and founder managers. We argue that CVC ownership and founder incumbency positively affect entrepreneurial firms’ R&D investment and, more importantly, that the CVC ownership effect is effectively amplified when the founder is an incumbent top manager because of goal congruence and knowledge spillover from the CVC firm. Our empirical analysis supports our hypotheses while addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Our results also support various mechanisms by utilizing the data on CVC investor’s board membership, CVC investor heterogeneity, the founder’s technological background, and the investee venture’s industry. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1133.

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