Monotonic Bargaining Solution for Allocating Critically Scarce Transboundary Water

As much as transboundary river basins can be niches for regional cooperation, they could also be causes for interstate water disputes. The risk of water conflict in these river basins is much higher during water scarcity. As a result, establishing a fair and efficient water allocation mechanism is key for the sustainable sharing of these river basins’ water. In this paper, the authors propose a monotonic water allocation mechanism for transboundary river basins under water scarcity by coupling the bankruptcy theory with the Asymmetric Kalai‐Smorodinsky bargaining solution concept. The allocation framework takes into account the aspiration water claims of the sharing countries. Additionally, as a case study, the allocation solution was used to allot the contested water of the Nile among the basin countries. For the medium term water demands the framework allocated 61.67%, 89.80%,91.82% and 61.67% of their water claims to Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and to the assumed coalition countries on the White Nile referred in this paper as equatorial states (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of Congo) respectively. On the other hand, for the long term demands, the allocation scheme allocated 63.65%, 69.36%, 71.42% and 60.41% of their water demands to the riparian countries in the same order. In general, the authors hope that the water allocation scheme applied in this article can contribute to the ongoing efforts to design river sharing solutions to river sharing problems in transboundary river basins by understanding the strategic interaction among riparian countries.