Closed-loop supply chain coordination through incentives with asymmetric information

A closed‐loop supply chain seeks to enhance the consumers’ environmental consciousness to increase both the profits and the return of past‐sold products. Even though, firms have misaligned interests for closing the loop: while all firms exploit consumers environmental consciousness to increase sales, only manufacturers use it for appropriating of returns’ residual value. Starting from a benchmark (no‐incentive) scenario where a manufacturer (M) is the leader and a retailer (R) is the follower, we develop two incentive games through a profit‐sharing contract to align firms’ motivations for closing the loop. In both incentive games, the incentive takes the form of a share of profits that M transfers to R. Our question is how the sharing fraction should be determined to make both players economically better‐off. The first incentive game assumes that R has no‐information on the sharing parameter, which is determined by M after R sets her strategies; thus the incentive has an endogenous nature. In the second incentive game the sharing parameter is common knowledge and both players know its values before the game starts, thus the incentive has an exogenous nature. We find that an endogenous incentive is never more economically and environmentally convenient than a no‐incentive game. In contrast, an exogenous incentive can make both players economically better‐off inside specific sharing parameter ranges. Nevertheless, when other forces (e.g., competition or legislation) impose the adoption of a profit‐sharing contract, M should supply an endogenous incentive when the exogenous share is either too high or too low.