On non-equilibria threshold strategies in ticket queues

In many real‐life queueing systems, a customer may balk upon arrival at a queueing system, but other customers become aware of it only at the time the balking customer was to start service. Naturally, the balking is an outcome of the queue length, and the decision is based on a threshold. Yet the inspected queue length contains customers who balked. In this work, we consider a Markovian queue with infinite capacity and with customers that are homogeneous with respect to their cost reward functions. We show that that no threshold strategy can be a Nash equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, we show that for any threshold strategy adopted by all, the individual’s best response is a double threshold strategy. That is, join if and only if one of the following is true: (i) the inspected queue length is smaller than one threshold, or (ii) the inspected queue length is larger than a second threshold. Our model is under the assumption that the response time of the server when he finds out that a customer balked is negligible. We also discuss the validity of the result when the response time is not negligible.