Understanding Bank-Run Contagion

Understanding Bank-Run Contagion

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Article ID: iaor20172492
Volume: 63
Issue: 7
Start Page Number: 2272
End Page Number: 2282
Publication Date: Jul 2017
Journal: Management Science
Authors: , ,
Keywords: game theory, finance & banking, behaviour, simulation, financial
Abstract:

We study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels and under which information conditions a panic‐based depositor run at one bank may trigger a panic‐based depositor run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players’ beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Observed withdrawals only affect depositors’ beliefs, and are thus contagious when they form an informative signal about bank fundamentals. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2416. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.

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