A Differential Game for a Multiclass Queueing Model in the Moderate-Deviation Heavy-Traffic Regime

A Differential Game for a Multiclass Queueing Model in the Moderate-Deviation Heavy-Traffic Regime

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Article ID: iaor20164503
Volume: 41
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 1354
End Page Number: 1380
Publication Date: Nov 2016
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors: ,
Keywords: networks: flow, networks: scheduling, queues: applications, control, risk, game theory, combinatorial optimization
Abstract:

We study a differential game that governs the moderate‐deviation heavy‐traffic asymptotics of a multiclass single‐server queueing control problem with a risk‐sensitive cost. We consider a cost set on a finite but sufficiently large time horizon, and show that this formulation leads to stationary feedback policies for the game. Several aspects of the game are explored, including its characterization via a (one‐dimensional) free boundary problem, the semi‐explicit solution of an optimal strategy, and the specification of a saddle point. We emphasize the analogy to the well‐known Harrison‐Taksar free boundary problem which plays a similar role in the diffusion‐scale heavy‐traffic literature.

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