Article ID: | iaor20162257 |
Volume: | 240 |
Issue: | 2 |
Start Page Number: | 661 |
End Page Number: | 681 |
Publication Date: | May 2016 |
Journal: | Annals of Operations Research |
Authors: | Shi Jing, Xiao Tiaojun |
Keywords: | information, quality & reliability, retailing |
In this paper, we develop two revelation mechanism models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under asymmetric information, where the retailer provides store assistance (SA) to reduce consumer returns rate and increase demand. Under full information, we find that a higher returns rate or returns handling cost increases the SA level if the market scale is sufficiently high. In the demand information asymmetry model, we find that: (i) the low‐type retailer (facing a low demand) has no incentive to distort demand information while the high‐type retailer may report wrong information; (ii) the manufacturer would like to design a menu of wholesale price‐order quantity contract to induce truthful demand information and the manufacturer pays an information rent to the high‐type retailer if the returns rate or returns handling cost for the retailer is sufficiently low; (iii) asymmetry of information does not change the monotonicity of the unit wholesale price in the retailer’s type, and information asymmetry decreases the retail price but increases the SA level. Unlike the demand information asymmetry model, a higher retailer’s returns handling cost expands the effects of information asymmetry on the retail price and the SA level, and using revelation mechanism decreases the channel profit if the retailer’s returns handling cost is sufficiently high under the returns rate information asymmetry model.