Incentive for Peer-to-Peer Knowledge Sharing among Farmers in Developing Economies

This study examines the peer‐to‐Peer interactions among farmers when both knowledge learning and sharing are available. We construct a stylized model in which heterogeneous farmers are endowed with their initial production capabilities and can post questions in the platform for help. A representative expert regularly monitors the forum and provides answers to the farmers’ questions, but may be non‐responsive sometimes due to the limited capacity. A knowledgeable core user (farmer) can choose to be silent or responsive, and is allowed to strategically determine the informativeness of her answers. The farmers face the minimum quantity restriction for attracting the buyers, and must make production before the time of sales. We show that in equilibrium the core user never provides answers that are more informative than the expert's, irrespective of her ex ante knowledge level. Redesigning or restructuring the platform does not help eliminate this inefficient knowledge provision. We also find that hiring more staff to frequently monitor the forum turns out to be detrimental for the peer‐to‐peer interactions. Moreover, the competition on knowledge sharing between the platform expert and the core user features strategic complementarity sometimes but strategic substitution at other times. Third, charging for the platform usage may discourage uninformative answers, but it could also discourage the core user from sharing knowledge with other farmers.