Contract analysis: A performance measures and profit evaluation within two‐echelon supply chains

Contract analysis: A performance measures and profit evaluation within two‐echelon supply chains

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Article ID: iaor20124185
Volume: 63
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 58
End Page Number: 74
Publication Date: Aug 2012
Journal: Computers & Industrial Engineering
Authors: , ,
Keywords: risk
Abstract:

Coordination is regarded as key in managing dependencies between distinctive members of a supply chain through the benefits of coordination mechanisms. Such coordination mechanisms are contracts, implemented to increase total supply chain profit, reduce costs and share risk among supply chain members. However, by contract implementation the retailer is constrained in his purchase by bearing the entire risk of holding the inventory (wholesale price contract) or by limited risk allocated to the supplier (buyback, revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts). By implementing an advanced purchase system the risk of inventory is fairly divided between the supplier and the retailer. In order to observe inventory implications on the supply chain bottom line, this article is directed towards the evaluation of performance measures and supply chain profit behavior under buyback, revenue sharing, quantity flexibility and advanced purchase discount contracts versus no coordination and wholesale price systems.

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