Article ID: | iaor2012705 |
Volume: | 43 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 141 |
End Page Number: | 172 |
Publication Date: | Feb 2012 |
Journal: | Decision Sciences |
Authors: | Cheng Hsing Kenneth, Bandyopadhyay Subhajyoti, Guo Hong |
Keywords: | government, networks |
Net neutrality (NN) is a widely debated policy issue that has the potential to alter the dynamics of accessing online content. The focal point of the debate lies in whether broadband service providers (BSPs) should be allowed to charge content providers for the preferential delivery of their digital content. This decision will affect broadband market coverage for end consumers as well as the issues of long-term competition and innovation in the market of digital content. Our research aims to analyze and address these issues. We propose a game theoretical model with three players–the BSP, the content providers, and the consumers–where the BSP, in its capacity as a gatekeeper between the content providers and the consumers, is modeled as a two-sided market platform. We find that while abandoning the principle of NN might sometimes result in increased consumer surplus and broadband market coverage, it can also hinder the ability of startups to compete against established rivals and thus reduce innovation at the edge. The results should be of great interest to policymakers as they debate on this very crucial issue.