Article ID: | iaor20101087 |
Volume: | 58 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 81 |
End Page Number: | 93 |
Publication Date: | Jan 2010 |
Journal: | Operations Research |
Authors: | Terwiesch Christian, Ren Z Justin, Cohen Morris A, Ho Teck H |
Keywords: | information, game theory |
In this paper, we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game-theoretical model. We find that in a one-shot version of the game, forecasts are not shared truthfully by the customer. The supplier will rationally discount the forecast information in her capacity allocation. This results in Pareto suboptimality for both supply chain parties. However, we show that a more efficient, truth-sharing outcome can emerge as an equilibrium from a long-term relationship. In this equilibrium, forecast information is transmitted truthfully and trusted by the supplier, who in turn allocates the system-optimal capacity. This leaves both the customer and the supplier better-off, compared to the nontruthful-sharing equilibrium.