Dynamic advertising with spillovers: Cartel vs competitive fringe

Dynamic advertising with spillovers: Cartel vs competitive fringe

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Article ID: iaor200972970
Country: United Kingdom
Volume: 30
Issue: 6
Start Page Number: 562
End Page Number: 572
Publication Date: Nov 2009
Journal: Optimal Control Applications and Methods
Authors: ,
Abstract:

A differential oligopoly game with advertising is investigated, where different dynamics occur between two groups of agents, the former playing a competitive Nash game and the latter cooperating as a cartel. Sufficient conditions for stability and a qualitative analysis of the profit ratio and social welfare at equilibrium are provided. A threshold value for the size of the competitive fringe is pointed out by a suitable numerical simulation.

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