Should price increases be targeted? – Pricing power and selective vs. across-the-board price increases

Should price increases be targeted? – Pricing power and selective vs. across-the-board price increases

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Article ID: iaor20083238
Country: United States
Volume: 53
Issue: 9
Start Page Number: 1407
End Page Number: 1422
Publication Date: Sep 2007
Journal: Management Science
Authors: , ,
Keywords: game theory
Abstract:

Firms in many industries experience protracted periods of pricing power, the ability to successfully enact price increases. In these situations, firms must decide not only whether to raise prices, but to whom. Specifically, in a competitive context, they must determine whether it is more profitable to increase prices across-the-board or to a specific segment of their customer base. While selective price decreases are ubiquitous in practice (e.g., better deals to potential new customers by phone carriers; better deals to current customers by various magazines), to our knowledge selective price increases are relatively rare. We illustrate the benefits of targeted price increases, and, as such, we expand the repertoire of firms' promotional policies. To that end, we explore a scenario where two competing firms must decide whether to increase prices to the entire market or only to a specific segment. Targeted price increases (TPI), i.e., being offered an unchanged price (selectively) when others are subject to price increases, can be offered to Loyals (those who bought from the firm in the previous period) or Switchers (those who did not). The effects of TPIs are estimated through a laboratory experiment and an associated stochastic model, each allowing for both rational (Loyalty, Switching) and behaviorist (Betrayal, Jealousy) effects.

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