The effects of costs and competition on slotting allowances

The effects of costs and competition on slotting allowances

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Article ID: iaor20082237
Country: United States
Volume: 26
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 259
End Page Number: 267
Publication Date: Mar 2007
Journal: Marketing Science
Authors: ,
Keywords: supply & supply chains
Abstract:

We consider the optimal two-part tariff contract between a manufacturer and a retailer. We show that retail competition (in the presence of either fixed costs or bargaining power) may lead to slotting allowances in an optimal contract, even with a monopoly manufacturer and no information asymmetry. On the other hand, slotting allowances do not arise with a monopoly retailer and no information asymmetry, whether the manufacturer is a monopoly or not. We also show that more intense retail competition, higher retail bargaining power, larger retailer fixed costs, lower marginal costs of retailing, as well as larger relative retailer size (whether coming from a location or operating advantage), have a positive impact on the incidence and the magnitude of slotting allowances. The opposing effects of the fixed and marginal operating costs on slotting allowances, as well as the impact of competition and bargaining power on profits, underscore the importance of careful definitions of these variables in empirical research.

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