Truth-telling equilibria for Bayesian games arising from sequencing situations

Truth-telling equilibria for Bayesian games arising from sequencing situations

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Article ID: iaor2007246
Country: Japan
Volume: 49
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 19
End Page Number: 32
Publication Date: Mar 2006
Journal: Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan
Authors: , ,
Keywords: game theory, queues: applications, design
Abstract:

This paper considers one-machine sequencing situations with linear costs in which the urgency of players is private information. To study strategic behavior of players based on neighbor switches we associate with such a situation a Bayesian game where the utility functions are based on gain split rules and study whether the truth-telling profile is an equilibrium of the game. The existence of such truth-telling equilibria turns out to be exceptional.

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