Article ID: | iaor2007246 |
Country: | Japan |
Volume: | 49 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 19 |
End Page Number: | 32 |
Publication Date: | Mar 2006 |
Journal: | Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan |
Authors: | Tijs Stef, Veltman Ari, Branzei Rodica |
Keywords: | game theory, queues: applications, design |
This paper considers one-machine sequencing situations with linear costs in which the urgency of players is private information. To study strategic behavior of players based on neighbor switches we associate with such a situation a Bayesian game where the utility functions are based on gain split rules and study whether the truth-telling profile is an equilibrium of the game. The existence of such truth-telling equilibria turns out to be exceptional.