Article ID: | iaor1996720 |
Country: | United States |
Volume: | 7 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 387 |
End Page Number: | 398 |
Publication Date: | Jul 1995 |
Journal: | Public Budgeting and Financial Management |
Authors: | Marando Vincent, Melchior Alan |
Keywords: | management, planning, politics, government, health services, game theory |
Contrary to the popular view of mandates as rigid and dictatorial mechanisms, this article advances a view of mandates as mechanisms for cooperation and negotiation. The relationship between several state and local actors is investigated in Maryland (USA), particularly within the context of the development of a ‘loosely’ mandated public helath program, the Targeted Funding Program (TFP). An alaysis of the TFP and the actors involved in the program’s development demonstrates how this program is designed to achieve much more than increased fiscal responsibility. The TFP is designed, and continues to be redesigned, to meet the political and professional objectives of various elected and appointed officials at the state and local levels.