Trial or No Trial: Supplying Costly Signals to Improve Profits*

Trial or No Trial: Supplying Costly Signals to Improve Profits*

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Article ID: iaor20173708
Volume: 48
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 795
End Page Number: 827
Publication Date: Aug 2017
Journal: Decision Sciences
Authors: ,
Keywords: behaviour, statistics: distributions
Abstract:

Many software and video game firms offer free trials with limited content to help buyers assess the likely value of the goods that they may purchase. This article examines fundamental issues related to the incentives and risks for a monopoly by providing a trial. Assuming that a seller can control the mix of components in a trial, we introduce a new mechanism for buyers’ inference of using a trial. We find that a trial may enable the seller to segment the market and charge a higher price to high‐valuation buyers, but can also cause a decline in demand. Moreover, the seller forfeits partial value of a full product through providing a free trial, so the benefit is offset by this cannibalization loss. In addition to the size and content of a trial, the distribution of buyers’ prior belief also affects a trial's ability to convey information. We show that a trial can provide more information if the prior belief is more concentrated in the tails of the distribution.

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