The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game

The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20172998
Volume: 46
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 715
End Page Number: 736
Publication Date: Aug 2017
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors: ,
Keywords: simulation, risk
Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non‐emptiness of the core for partition function form games. We generalize the Bondareva–Shapley condition to partition function form games and present the condition for the non‐emptiness of ‘the pessimistic core’, and ‘the optimistic core’. The pessimistic (optimistic) core describes the stability in assuming that players in a deviating coalition anticipate the worst (best) reaction from the other players. In addition, we define two other notions of the core based on exogenous partitions. The balanced collections in partition function form games and some economic applications are also provided.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.