Article ID: | iaor20172106 |
Volume: | 63 |
Issue: | 6 |
Start Page Number: | 1708 |
End Page Number: | 1729 |
Publication Date: | Jun 2017 |
Journal: | Management Science |
Authors: | Jiang Ming, Leider Stephen, Krupka Erin L |
Keywords: | game theory, social, simulation |
Using coordination games, we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists. We combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior. We demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance. Then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion. We estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10% of total earnings and more than 120% in the Bertrand game. We show that informal agreements affect behavior