Design of Auction Parameters to Reduce the Effect of Collusion

Design of Auction Parameters to Reduce the Effect of Collusion

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Article ID: iaor2017444
Volume: 47
Issue: 6
Start Page Number: 1016
End Page Number: 1047
Publication Date: Dec 2016
Journal: Decision Sciences
Authors: , ,
Keywords: decision, government
Abstract:

Government departments are increasingly turning to auctions to procure goods and services. Collusion among bidders, however, reduces competition and raises winning bid prices. Since conventional collusion control measures based on the redesign of auction mechanisms are less effective in government procurement auctions, there is a need to devise control measures that decrease the effect of collusion. This article demonstrates how the principles of design of experiments can be applied in a system dynamics model to find the auction parameter values that substantially reduce the effect of collusion in government procurement auctions. This research makes a number of contributions. First, it develops a feedback‐based dynamic mechanism of collusion in government procurement auctions. The mechanism proposes the winning bid price as being determined not by the total number of bidders but by the number of independent bidders. It defines each cartel as one independent bidder regardless of the number of bidders in the cartel. Second, the mechanism is tested by developing a system dynamics model to government auctions for procuring contracts for roadwork projects in India. Third, the principles of experimental design are applied to find the auction parameter values that ensure high bid participation and low winning price‐to‐reserve price ratios.

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