Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value

Compromising in bifocal distribution games: the average value

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20163731
Volume: 81
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 449
End Page Number: 465
Publication Date: Sep 2016
Journal: Theory and Decision
Authors: , ,
Keywords: game theory, behaviour, decision theory, decision theory: multiple criteria, allocation: resources
Abstract:

It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young, Equity in theory and practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifically, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a ‘natural’ cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler, SIAM J Appl Math 17:1163–1170, 1969) and the Shapley value (Shapley, Additive and non‐additive set functions. Princeton University, Princeton, 1953a) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.