Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit

Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit

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Article ID: iaor20164229
Volume: 41
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 1208
End Page Number: 1221
Publication Date: Nov 2016
Journal: Mathematics of Operations Research
Authors: ,
Keywords: information
Abstract:

We prove the existence of a pure subgame–perfect epsilon–equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the payoff functions have finite range, then there exists a pure subgame–perfect 0–equilibrium. These results extend and unify recent existence theorems for bounded and semicontinuous payoffs.

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