The role of capital adequacy regulation in the hedging decisions of financial intermediaries

This paper identifies the effect of capital adequacy requirements, which have been ignored to date in the hedging literature, on the forward hedging decisions of financial intermediaries. Using a more general framework than has been used in the literature on intermediary behavior in forward markets, cases are developed where capital and forward contracting are substitutes as well as where increasing the capital requirement increases the volume of desired forward contracting. The model shows that the most important factors in determining the equilibrium rate and the equilibrium position of intermediaries are the statistical association between the level of the forward rate and the spread between interest rates, the level of the capital‐to‐assets ratio, and the degree of risk aversion of intermediaries and other participants in the forward market. To characterize whether the intermediary's optimal forward position is long or short, one must have knowledge of at least the sign of the association between the level and spread for the particular intermediary, the intermediary's capital position, and whether the forward market equilibrium corresponds to a positive or negative premium. The model also demonstrates that a full hedge of assets is always sub‐optimal, and a universally applicable expression for the optimal hedge ratio when hedging is costless is derived.