Article ID: | iaor201529124 |
Volume: | 66 |
Issue: | 11 |
Start Page Number: | 1939 |
End Page Number: | 1947 |
Publication Date: | Nov 2015 |
Journal: | Journal of the Operational Research Society |
Authors: | Syms Richard, Solymar Laszlo |
Keywords: | game theory, behaviour, simulation, military & defence |
A dynamic competition model for an oppressive government opposed by rebels is proposed, based on coupled differential equations with constant coefficients. Depending on their values, the model allows scenarios representing a stable, oppressive government and violent regime change. With constant coefficients, there can be no limit cycles. However, cycles emerge if rebels and governments switch characteristics after a revolution, if resources change hands and rebel motivations switch from grievance to greed. This mechanism is proposed as an explanation for the establishment of a new repressive regime after the overthrow of a similar regime.