Voting games with abstention: Linking completeness and weightedness

Voting games with abstention: Linking completeness and weightedness

0.00 Avg rating—0 Votes
Article ID: iaor20141878
Volume: 57
Start Page Number: 172
End Page Number: 177
Publication Date: Jan 2014
Journal: Decision Support Systems
Authors: , ,
Keywords: computers: information, decision, behaviour
Abstract:

  • We study voting systems in democratic institutions in which abstention is allowed.
  • Some weighted systems are not complete for the influence relation.
  • We consider three new relations, each of them weaker than the influence relation.
  • We determine the desired notion of completeness being coherent with weightedness.
  • The research carried out is related with the determination of importance rankings.

    • Reviews

    Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.