A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

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Article ID: iaor20121541
Volume: 136
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 110
End Page Number: 115
Publication Date: Mar 2012
Journal: International Journal of Production Economics
Authors:
Keywords: game theory, information, supply & supply chains, optimization
Abstract:

We consider the design of full return contract in a simple supply chain with a risk‐free manufacturer and a risk‐neutral retailer. In this problem, the ordering quantity and the rebate price for unsold products are determined by the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. We propose an optimal solution procedure in centralized and decentralized decision making environments considering when the information sharing among the retailer and the manufacturer is partial. We provide numerical examples to explain the proposed solution procedures.

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