Article ID: | iaor201443 |
Volume: | 22 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 53 |
End Page Number: | 72 |
Publication Date: | Mar 2014 |
Journal: | Central European Journal of Operations Research |
Authors: | Wang Yong, Yan Xiaoming, Jiang Lin, Dai Wei |
Keywords: | competition and coalition, contracts |
It is common for multiple manufacturers to compete in one common market. This paper considers a three‐stage supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers, one distributor, and one retailer. The two manufacturers’ products are substitutable with each other, and both manufacturers sell their products through the common distributor and the common retailer. In this supply chain, three contract mechanisms are discussed. The first one is wholesale‐price (WP) contracts. The second one is pairwise revenue‐sharing (PRS) contracts indicating that the revenues are shared by all pairs of adjacent entities. The third one is spanning revenue‐sharing (SRS) contract indicating that the retailer simultaneously shares his revenues with all supply chain members. First, we discuss the effects of competition between manufacturers on both decentralized and centralized supply chains under the WP contracts. Second, we discuss the coordination mechanisms. The PRS and SRS contracts are used to coordinate the entire supply chain. We present the drawbacks of the PRS contracts in coordinating this competing supply chain and suggest using the SRS contract instead. After an SRS contract is adopted, it is evaluated using the WP contracts as a benchmark. The conditions necessary for an SRS contract to achieve a win–win outcome are then presented. Finally, some numerical examples are provided.