CEO Directors, executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives

CEO Directors, executive incentives, and corporate strategic initiatives

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Article ID: iaor201112339
Volume: 34
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 241
End Page Number: 277
Publication Date: Jun 2011
Journal: Journal of Financial Research
Authors:
Keywords: management
Abstract:

I study how directors who are chief executive officers (CEOs) of other firms affect board effectiveness. I find that CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance when other CEOs serve as directors. This is not an employment risk premium because CEO directors are not associated with higher turnover‐performance sensitivity. Also, CEO directors have no effect on corporate innovation but are associated with higher acquisition returns, especially for complex deals. My results suggest that the advisory benefits of CEO directors must be balanced against the distortions in executive incentives associated with their board service.

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