Pricing games of mixed conventional and e‐commerce distribution channels

In this paper, a distribution system is studied, in which a supplier sells a common product through conventional (physical retailer) and e‐commerce (e‐tailers) channels. We examine two types of Stackelberg pricing games and one type of Nash pricing game in this dual‐channel distribution system. We also analyze the effects of several key factors (i.e., the supplier’s pricing mode, game schemes, and efficiency of e‐channel in relation to acceptance of channels) on the resulting prices as well as the profits for the supplier and the retailer, respectively. This paper is an effort to examine modeling competition in the multiple‐channel environment from a pricing viewpoint. We find that channel acceptance plays a critical role in influencing equilibrium prices and profits in the dual‐channel distribution system. When the customer acceptance of one channel exceeds a certain threshold, this channel cannibalizes all retail sales and dominates the distribution system. The supplier can make more profits by adopting a differential pricing strategy; on the contrary, the retailer prefers uniform pricing. Numerical analysis indicates that both the supplier and the retailer are worse off in the Nash game than in the Stackelberg games. The supplier prefers an e‐channel with higher efficiency, whereas the physical retailer has to maintain higher channel acceptance to maintain its position in the distribution system.