Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states

Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states

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Article ID: iaor20131219
Volume: 74
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 463
End Page Number: 477
Publication Date: Apr 2013
Journal: Theory and Decision
Authors:
Keywords: behaviour
Abstract:

The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard’s and Sen’s paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard’s paradox and to Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.

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