Multilevel, threshold‐based policies for cargo container security screening systems

To mitigate the threat of nuclear terrorism within the US using nuclear material that has been smuggled into the country, the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has expanded its cargo container detection capabilities at ports of entry into the US This paper formulates a risk‐based screening framework for determining how to define a primary screening alarm for screening cargo containers given a set of dependent primary screening devices. To do so, this paper proposes two linear programming models for screening cargo containers for nuclear material at port security stations using knapsack problem models. All cargo containers undergo primary screening, where they are screened by a given number of security devices. The objective is to identifying the primary security outcomes that warrant a system alarm for each container risk group such that the system detection probability is maximized, subject to a screening budget. The base model is compared to a second model that explicitly requires a threshold‐based policy. The structural properties of the two models are compared, which indicates that all risk groups except at most one have deterministic screening policies. A computational example suggests that the detection probability is not significantly altered by enforcing a threshold policy.