Security threats to automotive CAN networks–Practical examples and selected short‐term countermeasures

Security threats to automotive CAN networks–Practical examples and selected short‐term countermeasures

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Article ID: iaor20108497
Volume: 96
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 11
End Page Number: 25
Publication Date: Jan 2011
Journal: Reliability Engineering and System Safety
Authors: , ,
Keywords: risk
Abstract:

The IT security of automotive systems is an evolving area of research. To analyse the current situation and the potentially growing tendency of arising threats we performed several practical tests on recent automotive technology. With a focus on automotive systems based on CAN bus technology, this article summarises the results of four selected tests performed on the control systems for the window lift, warning light and airbag control system as well as the central gateway. These results are supplemented in this article by a classification of these four attack scenarios using the established CERT taxonomy and an analysis of underlying security vulnerabilities, and especially, potential safety implications. With respect to the results of these tests, in this article we further discuss two selected countermeasures to address basic weaknesses exploited in our tests. These are adaptations of intrusion detection (discussing three exemplary detection patterns) and IT‐forensic measures (proposing proactive measures based on a forensic model). This article discusses both looking at the four attack scenarios introduced before, covering their capabilities and restrictions. While these reactive approaches are short‐term measures, which could already be added to today's automotive IT architecture, long‐term concepts also are shortly introduced, which are mainly preventive but will require a major redesign. Beneath a short overview on respective research approaches, we discuss their individual requirements, potential and restrictions.

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