Article ID: | iaor20108495 |
Volume: | 96 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 75 |
End Page Number: | 90 |
Publication Date: | Jan 2011 |
Journal: | Reliability Engineering and System Safety |
Authors: | Klanac Alan, Varsta Petri |
Keywords: | risk, design |
The paper describes a method for design of marine structures with increased safety for environment, considering also the required investment costs as well as the aspects of risk distribution onto the maritime stakeholders. Practically, the paper seeks to answer what is the optimal amount that should be invested into certain safety measure for any given vessel. Due to the uneven distribution of risk, as well as the differing impact of costs emerging from safety improvements, stakeholders experience conflicting ranking of alternatives. To solve this multi‐stakeholder decision‐making problem, in which each stakeholder is a decision‐maker, the method applies concepts of group decision‐making theory, namely the Game Theory. The method fosters axiomatic definition of the optimum solution, arguing that the solution, or the final selected design, should satisfy the non‐dominance, efficiency, and fairness. These three are thoroughly discussed in terms of structural design, especially the latter. Considering the coupling of environmental risk and structural design, the method also builds on the preference structure of four maritime stakeholders: yards, owners, oil receivers and the public, who either share the risks or directly influence structural design. Method is presented on a practical study of structural design of a tanker with a crashworthy side structure that is capable of reducing the risk of collision. The outcome of this study outlines a number of possibilities for successful improvement of tanker safety that can benefit, concurrently, all maritime stakeholders.