Article ID: | iaor20103572 |
Volume: | 21 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 15 |
End Page Number: | 36 |
Publication Date: | Mar 2010 |
Journal: | Information Systems Research |
Authors: | Krishnan Ramayya, Kannan Karthik, Greenwald Amy |
Keywords: | markov processes, information |
Each market session in a reverse electronic marketplace features a procurer and many suppliers. An important attribute of a market session chosen by the procurer is its information revelation policy. The revelation policy determines the information (such as the number of competitors, the winning bids, etc.) that will be revealed to participating suppliers at the conclusion of each market session. Suppliers participating in multiple market sessions use strategic bidding and fake their own cost structure to obtain information revealed at the end of each market session. The information helps to reduce two types of uncertainties encountered in future market sessions, namely, their opponents' cost structure and an estimate of the number of their competitors. Whereas the first type of uncertainty is present in physical and e-marketplaces, the second type of uncertainty naturally arises in IT-enabled marketplaces. Through their effect on the uncertainty faced by suppliers, information revelation policies influence the bidding behavior of suppliers which, in turn, determines the expected price paid by the procurer. Therefore, the choice of information revelation policy has important consequences for the procurer.