Article ID: | iaor20101947 |
Volume: | 44 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 63 |
End Page Number: | 86 |
Publication Date: | Feb 2010 |
Journal: | Transportation Science |
Authors: | Topaloglu Huseyin, Stier-Moses Nicols E |
Keywords: | network games |
Network games can be used to model competitive situations in which agents select routes to minimize their cost. Common applications include traffic, telecommunication, and distribution networks. Although traditional network models have assumed that realized costs only depend on congestion, in most applications they also have an uncertain component. We extend the traffic assignment problem first proposed by Wardrop in 1952 by adding random deviations, which are independent of the flow, to the cost functions that model congestion in each arc. We map these uncertainties into a Wardrop equilibrium model with nonadditive path costs. The cost on a path is given by the sum of the congestion on its arcs plus a constant safety margin that represents the agents' risk aversion. First, we prove that an equilibrium for this game always exists and is essentially unique. Then, we introduce three specific equilibrium models that fall within this framework: the