Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining

Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining

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Article ID: iaor200972163
Country: Germany
Volume: 38
Issue: 4
Start Page Number: 499
End Page Number: 520
Publication Date: Nov 2009
Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
Authors:
Keywords: bargaining
Abstract:

We study in what circumstance players alternate offers in bilateral bargaining. To examine this question, we suppose that players choose whether to take the initiative in each period. The player who tries to take the initiative is able to make an offer only when the other player does not. The probability that a player tries to take the initiative is referred to as the frequency of initiative taking. We assume that this is conditioned on mutually observable states and is, once chosen, unchangeable. When players make their frequency of initiative taking dependent on the identity of the latest proposer, the players alternate their offers (possibly with some stochastic delay). In contrast, when players always use the same frequency of initiative taking, or when players only distinguish odd-numbered from even-numbered periods for the frequency of initiative taking, both players constantly try to take the initiative. Consequently, an impasse arises.

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