Article ID: | iaor200970757 |
Country: | United Kingdom |
Volume: | 22 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 19 |
End Page Number: | 30 |
Publication Date: | Apr 2009 |
Journal: | OR Insight |
Authors: | Knott Matthew Robert |
Keywords: | safety, nuclear industry |
The original concept of operational research (OR) was applied to RAF operations at Strike (née Bomber) Command during and after the Second World War and came under the leadership of the likes of Watson-Watt and Blackett. The tools used in nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) have their origin in OR as developed in the 1950s and 1960s. OR was initially successful because of the use of independent scientists and mathematicians who cut-through the military hierarchy. PSA as proposed by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) as part of fault analysis of NPP can also be successful in improving the design and proposed operation, but it can be limited if only foreseen accident sequences are analysed. It is argued that OR can be applied to fault analysis of NPP in option assessment and hazard identification. In particular, synthesis of the experience from both fields would enable better analyses of the types of unforeseen accident sequences that occurred at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island and near-misses (Davis Besse).