Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions

Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions

0.00 Avg rating0 Votes
Article ID: iaor200969114
Country: United States
Volume: 55
Issue: 7
Start Page Number: 1184
End Page Number: 1198
Publication Date: Jul 2009
Journal: Management Science
Authors:
Keywords: bidding
Abstract:

We address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers. Each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities, and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. To design truthful double-auction mechanisms, we propose a novel ‘padding’ method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget. To the best of our knowledge, this ‘padding’ method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balanced, and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment. Furthermore, these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle/single-unit mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.

Reviews

Required fields are marked *. Your email address will not be published.