Equilibrium in a two-agent Assignment Problem

Equilibrium in a two-agent Assignment Problem

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Article ID: iaor200968957
Country: United Kingdom
Volume: 6
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 4
End Page Number: 26
Publication Date: May 2009
Journal: International Journal of Operational Research
Authors: , , ,
Abstract:

In this paper we address a particular generalisation of the Assignment Problem (AP) in a Multi-Agent setting, where distributed agents share common resources. We consider the problem of determining Pareto-optimal solutions that satisfy a fairness criterion (equilibrium). We show that the solution obtained is equivalent to a Kalai Smorodinsky solution of a suitably defined bargaining problem and characterise the computational complexity of finding such an equilibrium. Additionally, we propose an exact solution algorithm based on a branch-and-bound scheme that exploits bounds obtained by suitably rounding the solutions of the corresponding linear relaxation, and give the results of extensive computational experiments.

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