Article ID: | iaor2009529 |
Country: | Netherlands |
Volume: | 5 |
Issue: | 1/2 |
Start Page Number: | 119 |
End Page Number: | 140 |
Publication Date: | Feb 2008 |
Journal: | Computational Management Science |
Authors: | Vial Jean-Philippe, Haurie Alain, Moresino Francesco, Viguier Laurent, Vielle Marc, Drouet Laurent |
Keywords: | meteorology |
This paper proposes a computational game-theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place at the end of the period covered by the Kyoto protocol. These negotiations could lead to a self-enforcing agreement on a burden sharing scheme given the necessary global emissions limit that will be imposed when the real extent of climate change is known. The model assumes a non-cooperative behavior of the parties except for the fact that they will be collectively committed to reach a target on total cumulative emissions by the year 2050.