A fuzzy stochastic dynamic Nash game analysis of policies for managing water allocation in a reservoir system

In this paper a fuzzy dynamic Nash game model of interactions between water users in a reservoir system is presented. The model represents a fuzzy stochastic non-cooperative game in which water users are grouped into four players, where each player in the game chooses its individual policies to maximize expected utility. The model is used to present empirical results about a real case water allocation from a reservoir, considering player (water user) non-cooperative behavior and also same level of information availability for individual players. According to the results an optimal allocation policy for each water user can be developed in addition to the optimal policy of the reservoir system. Also the proposed model is compared with two alternative dynamic models of reservoir optimization, namely Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) and Fuzzy-State Stochastic Dynamic programming (FSDP). The proposed modeling procedures can be applied as an appropriate tool for reservoir operation, considering the interaction among the water users as well as the water users and reservoir operator.