Quality improvement and goodwill accumulation in a dynamic duopoly

Quality improvement and goodwill accumulation in a dynamic duopoly

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Article ID: iaor20083882
Country: Netherlands
Volume: 175
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 1021
End Page Number: 1032
Publication Date: Dec 2006
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research
Authors: ,
Keywords: game theory, advertising
Abstract:

This paper analyzes optimal advertising and quality improvement decisions by duopolist firms competing in a dynamic setting. An extended version of the Lanchester model is formulated where conformance quality and goodwill are both involved in competition for market share. Each competitor's new customer attraction rate depends on its own goodwill, while the disloyalty rate for current customers is influenced by the proportion of defective items. The search for a non-cooperative solution by qualitative as well as numerical means leads to definition of the optimal path for advertising and improvement efforts for each competitor, examined under a wide range of configurations.

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