Article ID: | iaor2008542 |
Country: | United States |
Volume: | 51 |
Issue: | 9 |
Start Page Number: | 1359 |
End Page Number: | 1373 |
Publication Date: | Sep 2005 |
Journal: | Management Science |
Authors: | Zeckhauser Richard, Miller Nolan, Resnick Paul |
Keywords: | measurement |
Many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities, products, and vendors. A scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback. Each rater merely reports a signal, and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater's report. Honest reporting proves to be a Nash equilibrium. The scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals. We also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems.