Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions

Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions

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Article ID: iaor20073737
Country: United States
Volume: 51
Issue: 3
Start Page Number: 508
End Page Number: 518
Publication Date: Mar 2005
Journal: Management Science
Authors: ,
Keywords: bidding
Abstract:

Low-revenue equilibria allow participants in an auction to obtain goods at prices lower than would prevail in a competitive market. These outcomes are generated as perfect equilibria of ascending-bid, multiunit auctions. We show that these equilibria are possible under mild conditions – conditions that are likely to prevail in many situations where auction formats have recently been adopted. We argue that these equilibria could explain the low revenues of some recent auctions, and discuss potential remedies to eliminate low-revenue equilibria.

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