Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations

Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations

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Article ID: iaor20072786
Country: Germany
Volume: 14
Issue: 1
Start Page Number: 1
End Page Number: 24
Publication Date: Mar 2006
Journal: Central European Journal of Operations Research
Authors:
Keywords: behaviour
Abstract:

Controllability is the decisive advantage of experimental research. Therefore this method suggests itself for investigating clear-cut hypothesis regarding the impact of managerial design issues on organisational behaviour. The current paper reviews selective experimental findings on behaviour under various incentives schemes. It is found that the effectiveness of fixed wages is to a large extent determined by social norms like reciprocity. Fixed wages are analysed if effort is intransparent and in the presence of career concerns. Furthermore they are contrasted with piece rate schemes. Different design options of relative compensation are discussed with a special emphasis on taking sabotage activities into account.

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