Efficient strategy proof fair allocation algorithms

Efficient strategy proof fair allocation algorithms

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Article ID: iaor20072
Country: Japan
Volume: 49
Issue: 2
Start Page Number: 144
End Page Number: 150
Publication Date: Jun 2006
Journal: Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan
Authors: , ,
Keywords: economics
Abstract:

We study a fair division problem with indivisible objects like jobs, houses, and one divisible good like money. Each individual is to be assigned with one object and a certain amount of money. The preferences of individuals over the objects are private information but individuals are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities in money. It is shown that there exist efficient algorithms for eliciting honest preferences and assigning the objects with money to individuals efficiently and fairly.

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