Article ID: | iaor2006313 |
Country: | Netherlands |
Volume: | 162 |
Issue: | 1 |
Start Page Number: | 270 |
End Page Number: | 280 |
Publication Date: | Apr 2005 |
Journal: | European Journal of Operational Research |
Authors: | Tijs Stef, Raghavan T.E.S., Solymosi Tams |
The question of allocating costs or benefits among the participants of a joint enterprise is frequently answered by determining the nucleolus of a related cooperative game. We discuss this issue in connection with multi-person decision situations in which finding the best course of joint action for a group of participants can be modeled by the well-known assignment optimization problem. The related transferable utility cooperative games are called permutation games. We consider the large subclass of so-called cyclic permutation games, and show how the nucleolus of an