Article ID: | iaor20041036 |
Country: | Netherlands |
Volume: | 35 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 273 |
End Page Number: | 286 |
Publication Date: | Jun 2003 |
Journal: | Decision Support Systems |
Authors: | Whinston Andrew B., Ba Sulin, Zhang Han |
Keywords: | decision: studies, bidding |
Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. However, fraud has been on the rise in these markets. Using a game theoretic approach, we propose a design of an economic incentive mechanism, the trusted third party (TTP), to serve the online auction communities. The proposed model addresses both the economic and technological aspects of online auction transactions by assigning a digital certificate to each participant. Thus, each participant's identity as well as his or her reputation can be established by other market participants. The analytical results demonstrate that when online transactions, take place with the assistance of digital certificates issued by a TTP, the most utilitarian course of action for a market participant is to behave honestly.