Article ID: | iaor2003679 |
Country: | Germany |
Volume: | 30 |
Issue: | 3 |
Start Page Number: | 437 |
End Page Number: | 448 |
Publication Date: | Jan 2001 |
Journal: | International Journal of Game Theory |
Authors: | Berninghaus S., Gth W., Lechler R., Ramser H.-J. |
Keywords: | bargaining |
Two parties X, and Y, can either bargain separately with a third party Z or merge to become XY and bargain collectively with Z. Depending on the payoff implications of the two possible contracts and on the asymmetry inherent in the conflict payoffs of X and Y collective bargaining will increase, decrease or leave constant what X and Y achieve together. In the experiment, first X and Y vote for or against collective bargaining and then negotiate accordingly. Participants react adequately to strategic aspects, but not as predicted by the (Nash-)bargaining solution.